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Abstract 
The literature on modeling defaults in individual financial institutions has expanded dra-
matically. However, the links between defaults in individual institutions and system-wide 
crises remain inadequately understood, despite some recent attempts to transpose the exis-
ting indicators of the probability of default in individual institutions to the systemic level. 
The paper argues that any measure of systemic stability should incorporate three ele-
ments: probabilities of failure in individual financial institutions, loss given default in fi-
nancial institutions, and correlation of defaults across institutions. It contains a review of 
existing measures of financial stability and finds that they generally fall short of this 
standard. The author demonstrates that looking at the distribution of systemic loss can 
lead to a clearer differentiation of cases of stability and instability. 
1.  Introduction 
One of the main challenges of stability analysis is the lack of an operational 
definition of its subject, i.e. financial stability. I propose to address this challenge by 
using the distribution of systemic loss as a measure of default risk in the system. 
The proposed measure combines three key elements: probabilities of default (PDs) in 
individual financial institutions, loss given default (LGD) in the institutions, and cor-
relation of defaults across the institutions. The measure is built from the bottom up, 
i.e. from individual defaults to systemic loss. It covers the full distribution of sys-
temic loss, not just a central tendency of the distribution. 
Using systemic loss to measure stability is not completely new. In stress 
testing, for example, results can be presented in terms of capital injections needed in 
response to losses from an adverse scenario (e.g., Čihák, 2005). Also, some recently 
proposed indicators of stability, such as the expected number of defaults (Chan-Lau, 
Gravelle, 2005), provide a very rough approximation for systemic loss. However, 
the analysis of financial soundness is dominated by other indicators (in particular, 
capital adequacy and other basic ratios, and distance to default indicators), with only 
a loose relationship to systemic loss. I survey the various indicators and find that 
each has weaknesses in terms of the three elements mentioned above. Some capture 
PDs in individual institutions, but approach all institutions as having the same sys-
temic impact, which leads to biased results. Others take into account loss given de-
fault, but do not reflect PDs or correlations of defaults. Also, most measures look at 
the central tendencies, disregarding potentially important information in the loss dis-
tribution. 
The contribution of this article is in proposing the use of the distribution of 
systemic loss, based on individual institutions’ failures, as a key measure of stability. 
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent those of the IMF or IMF 
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The proposal attempts to bridge two areas of research: one on PDs in institutions and 
one on losses on a portfolio. I illustrate the proposed framework by studying a range 
of indicators in instances of instability, using Monte Carlo simulations and empirical 
analysis using actual data. 
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 proposes a framework for 
measuring financial stability. Section 3 discusses how the various measures deve-
loped in the literature compare with this framework. Section 4 illustrates this general 
discussion with a simulation and an empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the ar-
ticle. 
2.  Distribution of Systemic Loss as a Measure of Financial Stability 
2.1  The Proposal 
There is a number of definitions of financial stability (for a survey, see e.g. 
(Čihák, 2006)). Some authors (e.g., Goodhart, 2006) have complained about the ple-
thora of definitions and the lack of a generally accepted definition of financial stability. 
However, most definitions agree on the basics, in particular that financial stability is 
about the absence of system-wide episodes in which the financial system fails to 
function (crises), and about resilience of financial systems to stress. The fact that there 
are differences in definitions is not unique to financial stability. Even in the area of 
price stability, for example, some rather basic issues (e.g., whether to include asset 
prices) are still subject to discussion. 
The aspect where analysis of financial stability is much weaker than the ana-
lysis of price stability is its lack of a widely accepted operational definition, or 
a measure of financial stability.
1 The analysis of price stability has a relatively clear 
operational definition in the form of inflation.
2 In contrast, there is a wide range of 
indicators of financial stability, from accounting ratios (e.g., capital to assets) to mea-
sures of PD derived from market prices or from supervisory early warning systems, 
and to indicators derived from stress testing. How to summarize the various measures 
into an indicator of stability remains an open issue. 
This section proposes a measure of financial stability that can be used in 
practice. To do so, we focus on the risk of systemic default. The general definitions 
of financial stability also encompass other issues, such as the smooth operation of 
the payment system and systemic liquidity. However, to treat those systematically is 
much more complicated. 
I propose looking at the distribution of aggregate loss in the system as 
a measure of stability. Using the literature on losses on loan portfolios as motivation 
(e.g., (Saunders, Allen, 2002)), I suggest looking at the financial system as a port-
folio of counterparty risks, the counterparties being the individual financial institu-
tions, each of them having a small, but non-zero chance of causing a loss to the sys-
tem. Such a portfolio can be thought of in similar terms as a bank loan portfolio, even 
though the nature of the risks raises specific issues (e.g., the portfolio effectively 
consists of the sum of the “tail” risks of individual institutions). 
1 Čihák (2006) makes this point based on a survey of financial stability reports issued by central banks. 
2 I say “relatively” because there are numerous practical issues with measuring inflation (e.g., index number
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More specifically, let us consider a financial system consisting of n financial 
institutions.
3 From the viewpoint of financial stability, the state of each institution in 
a given period can be characterized by the systemic loss associated with this insti-
tution, with the value equal to 0 if the institution i is solvent at time t and the value 
Li>0 (measured in percent of GDP) if the institution is in default. Li is a random 
variable with a distribution from 0 to Xi, where Xi is the maximum loss, or the “ex-
posure” of the system to this institution. 
To rephrase this using terms of the loan portfolio theory, we can break down 
the loss from an institution into three parts: a default variable di with a value of 0 
when the institution is solvent and 1 when it is insolvent; an exposure variable Xi, 
characterizing the institution’s size (“exposure” of the system to institution i), and 
variable Si that is the proportion of Xi actually lost at default (“severity” of the loss).
4 
Both di and Si are random variables, insolvency taking place with a probability PDi, 
and severity with a distribution f(µs,σs).
5 The multiple of exposure and severity, i.e. 
the actual loss occurring when there is default, is the loss given default.
6 








This includes, but is not limited to, analyzing key characteristics of the loss distri-
bution, such as its mean (ELs), variance (VarLs), extreme values (e.g., max Ls) as well 
as changes in these characteristics as a result of changes in external factors. Several 
features are important for this approach: 
1. This approach is derived from data on individual institutions (bottom-up), and 
takes into account differences in individual institutions’ PDs. 
2. The weight of individual defaults (LGD) plays a key role in the aggregation 
from the micro- to the macroprudential level. Probabilities of default are not 
additive, and giving the observations the same weight would risk biasing 
the results.  
3. The approach also takes into account correlation of defaults across the insti-
tutions. In systemic stress, defaults are likely to be highly correlated, so as-
suming away correlation could yield misleading results. 
4. The central tendency of the loss distribution (“expected loss”) is the starting 
point of the analysis. However, it is also important to look at the variability of 
losses across the states of the world (“unexpected loss”), and at the extreme 
losses that can materialize. It is also important to see how the distribution of 
3 Defining the boundaries of the “system” is straightforward if there is little cross-border activity (the sys-
tem is constituted by institutions incorporated and operating in a given jurisdiction). However, if there are
important cross-border financial activities, it may be important to define a “system” using financial insti-
tutions activities instead of country boundaries. For example, the system can be defined as a portfolio of
institutions active in a region. 
4 (1–Si) is the recovery rate (RR), a term used in BOX 1. 
5 In the portfolio risk literature, Si is often taken to be a draw from a beta distribution. The portfolio
literature often assumes that the distribution of severity is the same for all loans. That assumption may
need to be relaxed when we deal with financial systems. For example, it is possible that there is a positive
correlation between Si and Xi because of the “too large to fail” argument. 
6 A part of the credit portfolio risk literature uses the term “loss given default” for severity. In this article, 
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losses changes if there is a shock to an external factor shifting the distribution 
of losses (stress testing).
7  
5. Stability needs to be measured over a period of time. In this case, it is defined 
over one time unit. Generally, the longer the period, the more likely a crisis is 
to occur. 
6. The losses are expressed in percent of GDP, allowing the illustration of the mac-
roeconomic relevance of the observed (in)stability. 
2.2  Linking Individual Losses and Systemic Loss 
This section shows how the measure proposed here links individual defaults 
and systemic stability. The approach uses the basic insights from the credit portfolio 
risk theory (e.g.,(Saunders, Allen, 2002)), but applies them to a portfolio of financial 
institutions.
8   
Let PDi denote the probability of default of financial institution i over the next 
period.
9 Leaving out the time index to simplify notation, we can characterize the expected 
loss from the institution (i.e., the unconditional mean of its loss distribution) as 
ii i i EL PD X S =            (1) 
The systemic expected loss, ELS, is a summation of individual institution EL’s, just as 
the expected loss on a loan portfolio is a summation of losses on the individual loans: 







=∑            (2) 
Default is a Bernoulli (0-1) random variable, with a standard deviation of  (1 )
ii PD PD − . 
If we make the common assumption of portfolio risk literature of no correlation be-
tween PDi, Si, and Xi, we obtain the following formulation for standard deviation of 
loss, sometimes also called unexpected loss (ULi) in the portfolio loss literature: 
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Standard deviation of systemic loss (“unexpected loss” on the portfolio), ULS, is: 
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7 Goodhart (2006) argues that while analysis of price stability focuses on forecasting central tendencies, 
analysis of financial stability is about simulating extreme events. This distinction is exaggerated, because
the former should also test resilience of prices to external shocks, and the latter should start from a base-
line scenario. 
8 Kuritzkes, Schuermann, and Weiner (2005) use a very similar portfolio approach to model deposit
insurance. However, they look at the issue from a narrow perspective of measuring losses to the deposit
protection scheme. From a systemic perspective, loss to the protection scheme is only a part of losses from 
financial instability. 
9 In the literature on credit portfolio risk, probability of default is sometimes called “expected default fre-
quency.” A one-year horizon is typically referred to in the literature, but other time horizons are possible. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                9 
which can also be written as the sum of contributory unexpected losses, ULCi, from 


















The systemic risk depends on the contribution of the i-th institution to systemic 
volatility, ULCi, which is driven by two factors: the volatility of i’s losses, which in turn is 
driven by its PD and exposure, and its correlation with the rest of the system.  
Just as with a loss distribution on a loan portfolio, the cumulative loss distri-
bution for systemic loss will reflect the expected loss of the individual institutions in 
the system, the size of individual exposures, and the correlation of losses within the sys-
tem. The distribution will likely be heavily skewed and characterized by “lumpiness,” 
reflecting the contribution of individual large financial institutions, each imposing a dis-
crete, non-zero probability of a sizeable systemic loss. 
The loss distribution is really a characterization of the loss experience in all 
states of the world. We have so far only focused on the state of the system, but the state 
of the system is likely to be correlated with other variables, outside the financial system. 
We need a way to link default (and loss) to changes in states of the world. Consider, 
therefore, the probability of default, PDi, as determined by a function of systemic 
(“macro”) variables M, shared by all institutions, and an institution-specific idiosyn-
cratic stochastic component εi, 
    (,)
ii PD f ε = M          (5) 
Thus default correlation enters via M, but not all elements of M affect all 
institutions in the same way. All credit portfolio models share this linkage of sys-
tematic risk factors to default and loss. They differ in how specifically they are link-
ed. For brevity, we will follow the most popular approach, derived from the options 
pricing model by Merton (1974); however, using the other approaches is also pos-
sible under the proposed framework.
10  
We consider a simple structural approach to modeling changes in the credit 
quality of a firm. The basic premise is that the underlying asset value evolves over 
time (e.g. through a simple diffusion process), and that default is triggered by a drop 
in a firm’s asset value below the value of its callable liabilities. Following Merton 
(1974), the shareholders effectively hold a put option on the firm, while the debthold-
ers hold a call option. If the value of the firm falls below a certain threshold, the share-
holders will put the firm to the debtholders.  
The Merton model defines default as when the value of an institution’s assets 
declines to below the value of its liabilities. Employing the empirically estimated pro-













           (6) 
10 This approach is used by industry models such as by CreditMetrics or KMV’s PortfolioManager. Other
approaches include an econometric approach where PDi is estimated via logit with macro-variables entering 
the regression directly (Wilson, 1997), and an actuarial approach employed by CSFB’s CreditRisk+, where
the key risk driver is the variable mean default rate in the economy (see, e.g., (Saunders, Allen, 2002)). 10                     Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
where  (.) Φ  denotes the cumulative distribution of losses, typically assumed to be normal 
distribution in implementations of the Merton (1974) model. Building up the loss dis-
tribution is done by integrating the state-conditional losses over all states of the world. 
Recall that an individual loan will default when its asset return zi is less than the critical 
value ZD: 
               
1()
iD zZ P D Φ
− ≤=            (7) 
Following (5), asset returns can be decomposed into a set of k orthogonal 
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where βi,j are the factor loadings. The sensitivity to the common factor reflects the asset 
correlations. If there is one systematic factor, m (say, GDP growth), (8) collapses into 
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  This means for a given value of m the probability that an individual insti-
tution will default is: 
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 Conditional  on  m, we draw a standard normal variable εi, and check whether 
the institution defaults or not. This is characterized by an indicator function: 
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Then, for a given draw from state m, m(r), and draw εi, εi(r), the loss to i is 
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and the portfolio loss conditional on the state draw m(r) is 
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2.3 What Do We Mean by Loss? 
An important part of the proposed approach is the concept of loss. What is 
meant by losses? The macroprudential literature makes clear that it is concerned with 
systemic loss (see, e.g., the survey in (Čihák, 2006)). However, it is not very clear 
what types of losses (to whom) are considered. That has important implications for 
the analysis. Based on the literature, one can identify the following losses that may 
be relevant when monitoring systemic stability:  
1. Losses to creditors (depositors). One of the reasons for government interven-
tion in the financial sector is the potential for losses to depositors in banks. 
A natural approach to calculating losses would therefore seem to be losses 
for depositors. A practical issue in most banking systems is a large portion 
of depositors (in terms of their number) are a part of a deposit protection 
scheme, which substantially limits their losses. In terms of volume, a large 
part of losses to depositors consists of losses to the unprotected part of 
the deposit pool. On a macroprudential level, it is questionable whether one 
should be guided by losses to large depositors (or bondholders). 
2. Losses to a deposit protection agency. Studies such as (Kuritzkes, Schuer-
mann, Weiner, 2005) analyzed losses to the deposit protection scheme 
resulting from the payouts to protected depositors. This is very useful, but it 
may be too narrow a definition of systemic loss. For example, low losses to 
the deposit protection scheme do not mean low losses to depositors (in fact, 
it often means the opposite). 
3. Losses to owners. Studies that use prices of stocks to estimate probabilities of 
failure implicitly refer to losses to shareholders of the financial institutions. 
On a macroprudential level, it is questionable to what extent one should be 
guided by losses to financial institutions’ owners when measuring financial 
stability: the financial sector is not a government undertaking, but in most 
countries it is dominated by privately-owned profit-making firms. None-
theless, it is rather common for results of systemic stress tests to be express-
ed in terms of capital injections needed to bring all banks in the system to 
the regulatory minimum (e.g., (Čihák, 2005)). 
4. Losses to the public sector/fiscal accounts. This is a generalization of the pre-
vious concept. It would include losses to the deposit protection agency, 
losses to the public sector as owner or creditor of financial institutions, and 
possibly losses resulting from public sector guarantees (explicit or implicit) 
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5.  Losses on assets. Several studies define losses as the difference between 
the book value of an institution’s assets at the time of its closure and the value 
of the assets in a receivership by the deposit protection agency or the value of 
the assets to an acquirer (e.g., (James, 1991)). These losses include expenses 
incurred in the liquidation and sale of assets, losses associated with forced 
liquidation, and past unrealized losses (those that occur before a failure but are 
not reported at the time of the failure). 
6. Macroeconomic losses. This is a more general concept of losses, including 
those in terms of gross domestic product, employment, and other macro-
economic variables. This is an important concept, but in practice it may be 
extremely cumbersome to implement because these losses depend on factors 
such as the responses to stress by financial institutions’ owners, other mar-
ket players, and public authorities – factors that are difficult to address in 
a comprehensive model. 
None of these definitions is without drawbacks. Ideally, one would like to 
model the macroeconomic losses, but that can be extremely complicated. Modeling 
losses to the deposit protection agency is easier (although not trivial), but it tells little 
about the systemic loss. In the empirical part of this paper, we opt for defining losses 
in terms of assets. It is a relatively broad measure (which can be seen as an advan-
tage, since financial stability is a broad concept as well), and also one on which data 
are available relatively easily. 
3.  How Is the Systemic Loss Distribution Captured by Existing Measures? 
We will now use the general framework introduced in Section 2 to discuss 
the pros and cons of the various measures of financial stability (Table 1 summarizes 
the discussion). 
3.1  Individual Probabilities of Default Derived from Fundamental Data 
A number of studies focus on individual institutions’ probabilities of default, 
with limited attention to the exposure and loss given default for those institutions. 
For a long time, the literature on financial institutions’ defaults has been built on 
supervisory early warning systems (e.g., (Sahajwala, van den Bergh, 2000)), which 
try to cluster financial institutions into groups by soundness, using a range of finan-
cial ratios and other indicators.  
The models can be classified into three broad main groups. The first group 
is comprised of macroeconomic-based models, which attempt to assess how default 
probabilities are affected by the state of the economy. Macroeconomic-based models 
are usually employed for estimating sectoral or industry-level default rates or default 
probabilities. The second group is comprised of accounting-based or credit scoring 
models, which generate default probabilities or credit ratings for individual firms 
using accounting information. The third group consists of ratings-based models, 
which can be used to infer default probabilities when ratings information is available. 
Finally, there are hybrid models that generate default probabilities using as ex-
planatory variables a combination of economic variables, financial ratios, and ratings 
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Recently, one indicator that has been gaining attention as a measure of indi-
vidual financial institutions’ soundness is the z-score (e.g., (Boyd, Runkle, 1993), (De-
mirgüç-Kunt, Detragiache, Tressel, 2006), and (Hesse, Čihák, 2007)). The z-score is de-
fined as z ≡ (k+µ)/σ, where k is equity capital as percent of assets, µ is return as percent of 
assets, and σ is standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return volatility. 
The popularity of the z-score stems from the fact that it is inversely related to the pro-
bability of a financial institution’s insolvency, i.e. the probability that the value of its 
assets becomes lower than the value of its debt. The probability of default is given by 
()( )
k
pk d µ φµ µ
−∞
<= ∫ . If µ is normally distributed, then  () ( 0 , 1 )
z
pk Nd µ µ
−∞
<= ∫  
where z is the z-score. In other words, if returns are normally distributed, the z-score 
measures the number of standard deviations a return realization has to fall in order to 
deplete equity. Even if µ is not normally distributed, z is the lower bound on the pro-
bability of default (by Tchebycheff inequality). A higher z-score therefore implies 
a lower probability of insolvency. 
The z-scores have several limitations, perhaps the most important being that 
they are based purely on accounting data. They are thus only as good as the under-
lying accounting and auditing framework. If financial institutions are able to smooth 
out the reported data, the z-score may provide an overly positive assessment of the fi-
nancial institutions’ stability. Also, the z-score looks at each financial institution se-
parately, potentially overlooking the risk that a default in one financial institution 
may cause loss to other financial institutions in the system. 
An advantage of the z-score is that it can be also used for institutions for 
which more sophisticated, market based data are not available. Also, the z-scores 
allow comparing the risk of default in different groups of institutions, which may 
differ in their ownership or objectives, but face the risk of insolvency. For example, 
Hesse and Čihák (2007) use z-scores to analyze the stability of commercial, coope-
rative, and savings banks in respect to financial stability. 
3.2  Individual Probabilities of Default Derived from Market Data 
A number of indicators have been developed to calculate probabilities of de-
fault of individual institutions based on prices of financial instruments. These indi-
cators include distance to default (DD), bond prices, and credit default swaps. 
An advantage of using market prices is that they are generally available at high 
frequency, providing more observations and shorter lags than balance-sheet data. Also, 
while the accounting measures of risk (such as nonperforming loans) are backward- 
-looking, market-based indicators promise to incorporate market participants’ forward- 
-looking assessment. Finally, confidentiality is generally not an issue with market data, 
which makes it easier for data and results to be publicly shared and verified. 
The market-based indicators also have limitations. In particular, for them to 
contain useful information, the markets need to be liquid, transparent, and robust. 
Their usefulness is limited if securities are not publicly traded or their trading is 
limited (as may be the case, for instance, for government-owned or family-owned 
institutions). Also, if relevant information is not publicly disclosed (e.g., loan clas-
sification data in some countries), but it is collected by supervisors, prudential data 14                     Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
can be superior to market-based indicators in measuring financial sector soundness. 
Moreover, securities prices reflect potential losses to the security holders (bank 
owners for equity-based measures and bondholders for bond prices), which may be 
quite different from losses to banks’ depositors. Finally, the market based indicators 
are based on a number of strong assumptions. For example, the basic DD measures 
are constructed assuming that asset values follow a lognormal process, which does 
not capture extreme events adequately.
11 
Despite these potential limitations, empirical studies show that the market-based 
indicators can be helpful in forecasting distress in individual financial institutions, and in 
some cases outperform more traditional measures of soundness. The market-based in-
dicators have been shown to predict supervisory ratings, bond spreads, and rating agen-
cies’ downgrades in both developed and developing economies, performing generally 
better than “reduced form” statistical models of default intensities or measures relying on 
financial statements (e.g., (Arora, Bohn, Zhu, 2005)). More specifically:  
a) For data on the United States, Flannery (1998), Gunther, Levonian, and Moore 
(2001) and Krainer and Lopez (2003) find that securities prices are a leading 
indicator of changes in supervisory ratings of large, publicly traded U.S. banks. 
Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) conclude that supervisory assessments are 
generally worse than equity and bond market indicators in predicting future 
changes in the performance of large U.S. bank holding companies, even though 
supervisors may be more accurate when inspections are recent.  
b) For a sample of European banks, Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) find that dis-
tance to default and subordinated bond spreads predict bank defaults and rating 
downgrades up to 18 months in advance, and that these indicators can marginally, 
but not insignificantly, improve performance of models based on banking ratios. 
They also find that implicit safety nets weaken the predictive power of spreads.  
c) For U.K. financial institutions, Tudela and Young (2003) find that adding Mer-
ton-type market-based indicators to a model based on financial ratios signi-
ficantly improves the performance of that model.  
d) For banks in East Asia, Bongini, Laeven, and Majnoni (2002) find that during 
the 1996–98 crisis, the information contained in stock prices and credit ratings did 
not outpace balance-sheet indicators, even though stock markets responded more 
quickly to changing financial conditions than ratings of credit risk agencies.  
e) For 14 emerging market countries, Chan-Lau, Arnaud, and Kong (2004) find 
that DD can predict a bank’s credit deterioration up to nine months in advance. 
3.3  Portfolio Distance to Default and Related Indicators 
Given the favorable empirical results on the micro level, market-based 
indicators have become popular not only in the literature on defaults in individual in-
stitutions, but increasingly also on the macro level, in reports on systemic financial 
11 Additionally, the market-based estimates of PDs typically define default as a situation when the market
value of a firm’s assets falls below the value of its debts. However, in financial institutions, prudential super-
visors typically act before equity capital is exhausted. Measures such as DD may therefore overstate the like-
lihood that the institution would have to take corrective measures as its capital ratio falls. Chan-Lau and Sy 
(2006) and Danmarks Nationalbank (2004) present alternative risk measures, distance-to-capital and distance-
-to-insolvency, which take into account the fact that supervisors typically intervene before capital is exhausted. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                15 
stability by central banks and international institutions (Čihák, 2006). Transposing 
these indicators to the systemic level poses important aggregation challenges which 
are not always addressed in the literature. I will illustrate this in the example of stu-
dies using distance to default (DD). 
BOX 1  Market Based Indicators of Individual Institutions’ Probability of Default: A Primer 
The idea of using equity prices for assessment of financial institutions’ soundness comes 
from the insight that corporate securities are contingent claims on the asset value of the is-
suing firm. This insight, first highlighted by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), can 
be illustrated in the case of a firm issuing one unit of equity and one unit of a zero-coupon 
bond with face value D and maturity T. At expiration, the value of debt, BT, and equity, ET, are 
given by  == − − min( , ) max( ,0)
TT T BA D D D A  and  =− max( ,0)
TT EA D , where AT is 
the asset value of the firm at expiration. These two equations say that (i) bondholders only get 
paid in full if the firm’s assets exceed the face value of its debt, otherwise the firm is liquidated 
and assets are used to partially compensate bondholders; and (ii) equity holders only get paid 
after bondholders. These equations can also be interpreted in terms of European options: the first 
one states that the bond value is equivalent to a long position on a risk-free bond and a short 
position on a put option with strike price equal to the face value of debt. The second one states 
that equity value is equivalent to a long position on a call option with strike price equal to the face 
value of debt. Using the standard assumptions underlying the derivation of the Black-Scholes 
option pricing formulas, the default probability in period t for a horizon of T years is given by: 
             
σ







pN r T T
D
  
where N is the cumulative normal distribution, At is the value of assets in period t, r is the risk- 
-free rate, and σA  is the asset volatility. The numerator is the distance to default (DD), defined 
as the difference between the expected value of the assets at maturity and the default 
threshold, which is a function of the value of the liabilities. DD illustrates the probability that  
the market value of a financial institution’s assets will become lower than the value of its debt.  
Bond prices  can be used to provide information about default probabilities. Under risk 
neutrality, the price of a one-period zero-coupon bond (B) paying one unit of value at maturity 









, where p is the default probability, RR is the recovery rate, 










The intuition derived from this example was generalized by Fons (1987), under the assum-
ption of risk neutrality, for a bond with a larger number of periods to redemption. 
Perhaps the most direct way of obtaining probabilities of default is from credit default swaps 
(CDS). These contracts are analogous to insurance against default: the buyer of the CDS 
pays a quarterly fee (CDS spread) in exchange for protection against the default of a refe-
rence obligor during the life of the contract. If the obligor defaults, the protection buyer delivers 
a bond or loan of the reference obligor to the protection seller in exchange for the face value of 
the bond or loan. In the absence of market frictions, the probability of default can be calculated 
from the market price of the CDS spread (S), the risk-free interest rate (r), and the recovery 









 .   
The above measures calculate the risk-neutral (or risk-adjusted) default probabilities, which may 
differ from real-world default probabilities (those reflecting investors’ risk aversion). Chan-Lau (2006) 
reviews the literature on relationships between the risk-neutral and real-world probabilities of default. 16                     Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
Some of the studies use a simple or weighted average of the DDs or PDs for 
individual firms or banks (e.g., (Tudela, Young, 2003)). Taking a simple average can 
lead to very misleading results, because it does not take into account the differences in 
the size of institutions (and therefore loss given default). The use of weighted averages 
of DDs or PDs addresses this issue to some extent, but still does not address the issue 
of correlation of defaults among institutions. Because of the correlation, DDs or PDs 
for individual institutions are not simply additive. Using the weighted average may be 
a reasonable proxy when default correlations are low. However, when default cor-
relations are high, the average DDs or PDs do not capture swings in systemic risk, as 
illustrated, e.g., by Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005) for several East Asian countries 
during 1998–99.  
Other studies (e.g., De Nicolò et al., 2005) measure systemic risk using “port-
folio DD,” defined as 










=         ( 1 8 )  
where 
P i
t i A A =∑  and 
P i
t i LL =∑  are the total values of assets and liabilities, re-
spectively. The mean and variance of the portfolio are given respectively by 
ii
Pt i w µ µ =∑  and 
2 ij
P tt i j ij ww σ σ =∑ ∑ , where  /
ii i
tt t i wA A = ∑  and σij  is the asset 
return covariance of financial institutions i and j. Thus, the “portfolio” DD to some 
extent embeds the structure of risk interdependencies among the financial 
institutions. “Default” at date t + 1 occurs if  :
PP
tt A L < . Thus, the DD indicates how 
many standard deviations ln( / )
PP
tb A L  has to deviate from its mean for default to 
occur. Since 
P PP
tb b A LE =+, declines in  /
P P
tb A L  are equivalent to declines in capitali-
zation  /
PP
tb EL . The proponents of the “portfolio DD” suggest that it can be viewed as 
a risk profile measure tracking the evolution of the joint risks of failure of the firms 
composing a portfolio. Lower (higher) levels of the DD imply a higher (lower) 
probability of firms’ joint failure. Since variations in the individual firms’ DD are 
allowed to offset each other, the DD of a portfolio is always higher than the (weight-
ed) sum of the DDs of the individual firms. As a result, the probability of “failure” 
associated with the portfolio DD is always lower than that associated with the actual 
probability of joint failures of sets of firms in the portfolio. Thus, the “portfolio” DD 
tracks the lower bound to the joint probabilities of failure. 
This approach to some extent overcomes the lack of additivity for DDs in 
individual institutions and partly takes into account the different sizes of the insti-
tutions. However, it is based on a number of simplifying assumptions, resulting in 
a potentially biased indicator. In particular, it just adds all the assets and liabilities in 
the system, creating a single fictitious “mega-institution”. As a result, this approach 
understates the risk of failures in the system and the risk that such failures will grow 
into a systemic problem. For example, if the value of assets in i goes below the value 
of its liabilities, 
ii
tt A L < , the institution fails and can potentially trigger failures in Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                17 
other institutions through their exposures to i, even if they would not fail in the first 
place. In the case of portfolio DD, the impact in the decline of 
i
t A  can be offset by 
an increase in the asset value of another institution, 
j
t A . This approach therefore under-
estimates not only the risk of failures in individual institutions, but also the risk of 
contagion within the system. That is an important omission from the viewpoint of fi-
nancial stability analysis.
12 
Similarly to “portfolio DD,” one can define “portfolio z-score,” defined as 
z ≡ (k+µ)/σ, where k is total equity capital in the system as percent of total assets in 
the system, µ is total return as percent of total assets, and σ is standard deviation of 
the aggregate return on aggregate assets as a proxy for return volatility. The “port-
folio  z-score” is a direct analogue of the “portfolio DD” for accounting data. 
Section 4 of this article shows values of the “portfolio z-score” in a range of coun-
tries. Similarly to the portfolio DD, the portfolio z-score is always higher than 
the sum of z-scores for the individual institutions. As with the portfolio DD, an im-
portant weakness of the portfolio z-score from the viewpoint of the framework 
introduced in Section 2 is that it does not take into account contagion among insti-
tutions.  
Related to the portfolio DD is also the contingent claims approach, which 
integrates option-based analysis along the lines of Merton (1974) within a macro-
economic framework with explicit linkages between contingent liabilities in the cor-
porate, banking, and government sectors (e.g., (Gapen et al., 2004). Because the mo-
deling of contingent liabilities is based on Merton (1974) and risk measures at the fi-
nancial and non-financial sectoral level are obtained using aggregate data, the same 
caveats as discussed above apply. 
3.4  First and Nth to Default 
The First-to-Default (FTD) probability, or the probability of observing one 
default among a number of institutions, has been proposed as a measure of systemic 
risk for large and complex financial institutions (IMF, 2005); (Avesani, 2005). This 
measure is constructed using risk-neutral default probabilities implied from credit 
default swap spreads. The FTD probability addresses one of the shortcomings of 
the  DD measures, namely, the possibility that defaults among a number of insti-
tutions can be correlated. However, the major shortcoming of the FTD probability is 
its poor performance at capturing changes in the common component across insti-
tutions. For example, Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005) illustrate that the FTD pro-
bability for the Korean corporate sector actually declined during the Asian crisis 
period. This result follows from the fact that a systemic crisis is the observable out-
come of a common negative shock. Thus, for any time horizon, the likelihood of ob-
serving exactly one default among a number of institutions diminishes, while the pro-
bability of observing more defaults increases.  
12 To illustrate the issue with this aggregation, one can also look at the extreme example of a system con-
sisting of two banks of equal size, with capital to asset ratios of 0 and 100 percent, respectively. The de-
fault risk of the “mega-institution,” with a 50 percent capital to asset ratio, is not representative of the de-
fault risk in the system. 18                     Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
 
In a recent study, Avesani, García Pascual, and Li (2006) propose using 
a nth-to-default credit-default-swap (CDS) basket of large complex financial institu-
tions to determine PDs. This approach addresses the problems of using the first-to- 
TABLE 1  Indicators of Systemic Stability: Overview of Pros and Cons 
Indicator  Advantages  Disadvantages 




* Easy to calculate from 
individual institutions’ DDs, 
z-scores, or PDs. 
* Does not reflect contagion (correlation across 
failures). 
* Does not reflect differences in loss given 
default in institutions, even though that can 
be partially addressed by weighting. 
* DD requires liquid market in financial 
institutions’ stocks; liquid bond or CDS 
markets required if those markets are used to 
estimate PDs. 
Portfolio DD or 
portfolio z-score 
* Easy to calculate. 
* Unlike simple averaging, 
reflects to some extent 
the differences in institu-
tion sizes and correlation 
across institutions. 
* Does not fully reflect contagion, correlation 
across failures. 
* Does not fully reflect differences in loss given 




* Clear theoretical 
underpinnings for the nth- 
-to-default indicator. 
* Do not fully reflect different LGDs in 
institutions. 





* Relatively easy to interpret.  * Does not reflect different LGDs in institutions. 
* Difficult to calculate, not a closed-form expres-
sion. 
* Focuses only on central tendency of 
the distribution. 





ming loans to 
total loans) 
* Relatively easy to 
calculate. 
* No clear link to probabilities of default found 
yet. 
* No clear link to systemic stability found yet. 
Stress test 
results 
* Takes into account 
differences in loss given 
default in institutions. 
* Takes into account extreme 
situations. 
* Methodology not yet settled. 
* Sensitivity to assumptions. 
* Focus on extreme situations. 
 
“Stress Index” of 
Swiss National 
Bank 
* Clear definition.  * Unclear relationship to probabilities of default 
and systemic stability. 
Distribution of 
systemic loss 
* Captures differences 
in loss given default 
in institutions. 
* Captures correlation across 
institutions failures. 
* Focuses only on central 
tendencies. 
* May be difficult to calculate in some cases; no 
closed-form expression. 
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-default CDS data. However, it does not address differences in institutions’ sizes 
(LGDs). In principle, it may be possible to bypass this issue by grouping financial 
institutions into baskets of similar size; however, the creation of nth-to-default bas-
kets has been driven by market participants’ needs and not necessarily by financial 
stability considerations. This criticism does not mean that nth-to default baskets are 
not a potentially useful approach to measuring stability. If the baskets are defined 
properly and if there are liquid markets, this is a very promising approach that offers 
a direct way to measure financial stability. 
3.5  Expected Number of Defaults (END) 
Chan-Lau and Gravelle (2005) propose measuring systemic default risk 
using the expected number of defaults (END), based on the joint occurrence of de-
faults among a number of institutions.
13 Using equity prices and balance-sheet data, 
they calculate the END to assess systemic risk in the corporate sector in Korea, Ma-
laysia, and Thailand. 
The END has advantages compared to indicators such as the portfolio DD. 
First, it relaxes some of the underlying assumptions of the DD calculations, such as 
the assumption that asset prices are continuous and the level of liabilities is constant; 
this makes the calculation more realistic and can yield non-negligible default pro-
babilities even over short time horizons. Second, and more important, the END takes 
a less ad-hoc approach to aggregating the PDs in individual institutions than the “port-
folio DD” or average PD or DD measures.  
Two main problems with the END relate to the fact that it is focused on 
the number of defaults. First, unlike the systemic loss (which is expressed as a per-
centage of GDP), the END is difficult to compare across financial systems with dif-
ferent numbers of institutions. Second, the END treats all the financial institutions 
the same, irrespective of their systemic importance. The first issue is relatively easy 
to fix: one can present the END as a ratio to the total number of institutions in 
the system. The second problem is more difficult to address. The END indicator is 
derived by taking the Vasicek (2002) model of distribution of loan portfolio values 
and applying it to a portfolio of banks. However, the model assumes that all items in 
the portfolio are the same. The model therefore works well only if the portfolio is not 
dominated by a few exposures much larger than the rest – a condition that is not sa-
tisfied in most financial systems. 
3.6  Other Approaches 
Numerous studies have used cross-section or panel data on soundness or 
defaults in individual institutions to model systemic issues. For example, they have 
tried to regress DDs or z-scores for individual institutions on a number of institution- 
-level and country-level explanatory variables (e.g., (Krainer, Lopez, 2003); (Hesse, 
Čihák, 2007)). These approaches can yield interesting results; however, institution- 
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-by-institution regressions typically do not allow effective measuring of contagion 
among financial institutions and differences in sizes.
14  
A large body of statistics has also been developed on the macroprudential 
level, using practical consideration and expert assessment. These include basic system- 
-level ratios, such as capital to risk-weighted assets or gross nonperforming loans to 
total gross loans (IMF, 2004). Emerging empirical analysis shows that these variables 
are correlated with macroeconomic variables (e.g., (IMF, 2003)) and with the presence 
of systemic crises (Čihák, Schaeck, 2007). However useful, these indicators generally 
do not have a clear micro-level link to PDs or LGDs (e.g., a high capital-adequacy ratio 
or a lower nonperforming-loan ratio does not necessarily mean a more stable institution 
if there are offsetting risks). Empirical research into how these variables can be com-
bined into a composite indicator is ongoing. Recently, the Swiss National Bank started 
publishing a “stress index” (Swiss National Bank, 2006), which combines a set of ac-
counting, market-based, and other indicators into a single number. However, the link 
between this indicator and systemic stability is unclear. 
4.  Empirical Illustration 
4.1  How Sensitive Are “Systemic” Measures to Aggregation? 
To illustrate the point that concentration of losses has important implications 
for systemic stability, let us assume that LGDs are correlated with total assets of 
an institution, Ai, and that the institution’s asset size and rank in terms of assets, Ri, 
are related by 
ii A cR
α − =⋅ .
15 Let us consider, for example, a system with 50 banks 
and α = 1. If the expected number of defaults is five, it is important to know whether 
the failures affect the five largest institutions (more than 50 percent of the system’s 
assets) or the five smallest institutions (about two percent of the assets). Analyzing 
the number of defaults of the average bank can yield misleading results. 
Figure 1 illustrates this point by using a Monte Carlo simulation. We focus 
on financial systems where the institution-by-institution LGDs are characterized by 
the above distribution with α = 1. To illustrate the impact of concentration of losses, 
we allow there to be a correlation between PDs and LGDs and change the correlation 
of the two in a number of steps from positive to negative, and running 1,000 itera-
tions for each of the steps. The figure illustrates that if PDs and LGDs are positively 
correlated (i.e., if larger institutions tend to be more likely to fail), the expected sys-
temic loss is generally higher. The figure, however, also illustrates that focusing on ex-
pected systemic loss is not sufficient, since the actual loss can reach multiples of the ex-
pected value.  
Table 2 reinforces this point using actual data from the 25 banking systems in 
the European Union. The table illustrates that if END = 5, the expected share of affected 
14 Differences in financial institution size can be addressed by including size as an explanatory variable or,
preferably, as weight in a weighted regression. However, contagion among financial institutions is more 
difficult to address in a regression. 
15 This is not an unrealistic assumption. Empirical evidence shows that the distribution of firm sizes in
various sectors follows this relationship (Stanley et al., 1995). Alegria and Schaeck (2006) find the same
distribution for asset sizes in banks, with slope coefficients in individual countries from 0.25 to 1. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                21 
banks can be from 0.2 percent (the Netherlands) to 9.5 percent (Malta). However, if 
the actual share can be seven to 440 times bigger, it can reach even 98 percent (Estonia). 
Therefore, if failures are concentrated in large institutions, using the number of failures 
can lead to a misjudgment on the order of several hundred.
16  
4.2  What Do the Systemic Stability Indicators Measure? 
The literature says relatively little about whether systemic stability indi-
cators actually indicate observed instances of systemic problems. One of the excep-
tions is Čihák and Schaeck (2007), analyzing how well basic aggregate ratios identify 
banking problems. For market-based indicators (which generally perform better on 
the level of individual institutions), the available studies that focus on the systemic 
level (e.g., De Nicolò et al., 2005) analyze correlations of these indicators with 
macroeconomic and other variables, but not how well these indicators actually mea-
sure observed situations of distress. An exception is the study by Chan-Lau and Gra-
velle (2005), discussing the path of the END indicator during the 1997 Asian crisis. 
However, I am not aware of a study that would examine market-based indicators and 
systemic failures systematically.  
This section looks at the behavior of a range of indicators in periods of 
crises. As in Čihák and Schaeck (2007), I follow the listing of crises since the 1970s 
provided by Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), which has become a standard in the lite-
rature on early warning models for banking problems. It defines systemic banking 
crises as episodes during which most or all bank capital was exhausted, identifying 
117 such crises in 95 countries since the early 1970s. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of an analysis of DD, z-score, and systemic 
loss in a number of crisis countries. For DD and systemic loss, the analysis is based 
on daily equity price data in 1990–2004; for the z-score, it uses annual data from fi-
nancial reports from 1994–2004. It covers 29 countries, including 12 in which a sys-
temic banking crisis started during this period according to Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003). For the DD and the z-score, we present the unweighted and weighted 
16 Similar issues relating to adjustment of differences in size arise also in other areas of economics. For
example, in the literature on economic growth, Sala-i-Martin (2002) obtains different conclusions on global 
income inequality depending on whether or not he weights country-level data by the size of the country. 
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averages across institutions (using total assets as the weight), and the portfolio DD 
and  z-score. For the systemic loss calculation, I use the framework described in 
Section 2. To be able to implement it on such a relatively wide sample, I approximate 
the exposure to an institution, Xi, by its total assets, and the loss given default by 
0.3 Xi.
17 We then use (2) and (4) to calculate the expected and unexpected loss given 
default, using the Merton (1974) approach to calculate the PDs. In keeping with 
the framework in Section 2, it would be interesting to analyze also other moments of 
the loss distribution, but to keep the comparison simple, we focus on these two mo-
ments.
18 
The preliminary conclusion one can draw from Table 3 is that (i) the in-
dicators indeed indicate increased instability; and (ii) taking the LGDs and 
correlations across failures into account improves the measurement. Specifically, 
TABLE 2  Concentration of Banking Systems in the EU 









 b  
Share 
of 5 largest 
banks divided 
by share 
of 5 random 
banks 
Austria  880  45.0  0.57    79 
Belgium  100  85.2  0.78  109 
Cyprus  391  59.8  0.52  115 
Czech 
Republic    56  65.5  3.38    19 
Denmark  197  66.3  0.88    76 
Estonia    11  98.1  1.58    62 
Finland  363  83.1  0.24  352 
France  854  53.5  0.27  195 
Germany        2,089  21.6  0.19  115 
Greece    62  65.6  3.02    22 
Hungary  215  53.2  1.11    48 
Ireland    78  46.0  3.70    12 
Italy  792  26.7  0.47    57 
Latvia    23  67.3  9.08     7 
Lithuania    78  80.6  1.33    61 
Luxembourg  155  30.7  2.31    13 
Malta    18  75.3  9.50      8 
Netherlands  401  84.8  0.19  442 
Poland  739  48.6  0.35  139 
Portugal  186  68.8  0.86    80 
Slovakia    23  67.7  8.97      8 
Slovenia    25  63.0  9.25     7 
Spain  348  42.0  0.85    50 
Sweden  200  57.3  1.09    52 
UK  400  36.3  0.81    45 
Euro Area        6,308  43.0  0.05  951 
EU-25        8,684  42.3  0.03        1,273 
Notes: 
a Share in terms of total assets, measured in percent.  
    b Sum of squared market shares (in terms of total assets, in percent). 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the European Central Bank. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                23 
the difference between the average crisis observations and average non-crisis ob-
servations has the expected sign (negative for DD and z-score and negative for 
systemic loss). The signal-to-noise ratio (the difference between the means of crisis 
and non-crisis observations, divided by the two standard deviations) is higher for 
weighted averages than for simple averages, and even higher for “portfolio” mea-
sures, indicating the importance of institutions’ sizes (and LGDs). The signal-to- 
-noise ratio improves further when using the systemic loss, i.e. when we more ex-
plicitly reflect both the effect of LGDs and the correlation of defaults. A more 
detailed analysis of the indicators would go beyond the scope of this article, which 
only attempts to illustrate the usefulness of systemic losses when analyzing stability. 
 
TABLE 3  Distance to Default, z-Scores, and Expected Loss in Crises 
a 
Crisis  Non-crisis 
Indicator 
Obs.
b  Mean  Std.
c  Obs.







Distance to default               
  Unweighted  62,188  58  24  43,848  128  56  0.9 
  Weighted  62,188  62  26  43,848  116  27  1.0 
  Portfolio  62,188  51  25  43,848  118  26  1.3 
z-score               
  Unweighted  255  34  15  180  63  25  0.7 
  Weighted  255  35    9  180  55  13  0.9 
  Portfolio  255  32  22  180  89  28  1.1 
Systemic loss 
(% GDP)               
  Expected  62,188  2.2  0.8  43,848  0.1  0.7  1.4 
  Unexpected  62,188  2.8  1.0  43,848  0.2  0.7  1.5 
Notes: 
a Included are observations for Argentina*, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil*, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary*, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan*, Korea*, Malaysia*, 
the Netherlands, Norway*, the Philippines*, Poland*, Portugal, Spain, Sweden*, Thailand*, 
Turkey*, the United Kingdom, and the United States (asterisks denote systems for which Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) identify a crisis starting between 1990 and 2003). 
b Number of system-level observations (the number of individual bank observations on which these 
system-level observations are based) is a multiple of this number. 
c Standard deviation across the crisis (or non-crisis) observations. 
d Absolute value of the difference of the two means (for crisis and non-crisis observations), divided by 
the sum of the two standard deviations. If crises are identified properly, better indicators should 
show a higher signal-to-noise ratio (assuming that the signal is correct, i.e. the difference of the two 
means has the expected sign). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from BankScope, DataStream, and Bloomberg. 
17 The assumed severity of 0.3 is based on the existing empirical work on losses in failures. In particular,
analyzing about 800 bank failures, James (1991) finds that losses on assets (defined as the difference
between book value and recovery value net of direct expenses) average at 30 percent. The calculation of
systemic loss could be improved by allowing LGD to be a random variable (e.g., following the distribution
estimated in (James, 1991)). However, that turned out to be too computationally complex for this sample. 
18 The expected loss calculation is similar to that for the END indicator, but with institutions weighted by 
the LGDs. Table 3 does not show the END because it is correlated with the total number of institutions,
making cross-country comparisons difficult. It also does not show the nth-to default indicator, because of 
a lack of data. 24                     Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
5. Conclusion 
The key point of this article is that it is useful to look at the financial system as 
a portfolio of counterparty exposures, the counterparties being financial institutions, 
and analyze the distribution of loss on that portfolio. This approach combines proba-
bilities of default, losses given default, and correlations of defaults in the system.  
We have evaluated the existing measures of financial stability and found 
that they generally come up short. Studies focusing on probabilities of default tend to 
overlook the fact that “size matters”, i.e. financial institutions are not all the same. Other 
studies do not appropriately reflect the institutions’ probabilities of default or cor-
relations of defaults. Also, most measures look at the central tendencies of the loss 
distribution, potentially disregarding important information in the rest of the loss dis-
tribution.  
The empirical analysis in this article illustrates this point. I find that the re-
sults of some of the market-based indicators of financial sector stability proposed in 
the literature can be altered substantially if one takes into account the differences in 
loss given default. I also find some evidence suggesting that accounting for the dis-
tribution of losses can lead to a clearer distinction between financial stability and si-
tuations of instability. 
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